This paper shows that, in an environment where we do not bound the number of faulty processes, the class P of Perfect failure detectors is the weakest (among realistic failure detectors) to solve fundamental agree ment problems like uniform consensus, atomic broad cast, and terminating reliable broadcast (also called Byzantine Generals).
Introduction

Motivation
It is well known that agreement is at the heart of re liable distributed computing, but is rather difficult to achieve in a failure-prone environment. In particu lar, without any synchrony assumptions (i.e., assump tions on process relative speeds and communication delays), agreement is impossible even among a set of distributed processes that communicate through reli able channels and at most one of them might fail (and it can do so only by crashing) [5] . In fact, synchrony assumptions are needed to provide processes with in- The motivation of our work is to determine the exact information about failures needed to achieve agree ment in an environment where we do not bound the number of failures (we focus here on process crash failures). Roughly speaking, determining that infor mation comes down to providing an abstract metric' that helps measure whether a set of synchrony as sumptions are necessary and sufficient to reach agree ment [3J.
We consider in this paper two fundamental agreement problems: consensu.s and terminating reliable broad cast. In the consensu.s problem, processes need to de cide on a common value among one of the proposed values. 1 Solving this problem is known to be equiva lent to solving the atomic broadcast problem [IJ, in any system where only a finite number of messages can be lost, e.g., with reliable channels. This problem consists in delivering messages to processes in a reliable and to tally ordered manner. Solving this problem is a key to building highly available and consistent replicated ser vices. Terminating reliable broadcast is a strong and convenient form of reliable broadcast: the processes should deliver the same sequence of messages, just like with reliable broadcast but, in addition, should deliver a specific nil value for every message that was broad cast by a faulty process and not delivered by any COf rect process [11] . This problem is a rephrasing, in the crash-stop model, of the famous Byzantine Generals problem [13] .
1 By default, we consider the uniform variant of the con sensus problem, which precludes any disagreement among two processes, even if one of them ends up being faulty [10) . In Section 6, we discuss the impact of going back to the COTTect restricted variant of consensus, which is solely of theoretical interest.
Background: the failure detector hierarchy
In a seminal paper [1] , Chandra 
Contributions
In an environment where we do not restrict the num ber of possible failures, determining the weakest failure detector classes for problems like consensus (thus for atomic broadcast) and terminating reliable broadcast have been open for almost a decade now. We show here that there is one answer to these questions: P.
More precisely, if any number of processes can fail, P is the weakest failure detector class to solve consen sus (hence atomic hroadcast) and terminating reliable broadcast.
We state and prove our result using simple algorithm reductions (as in [2) ) and following the original fail ure detector formalism of [11, with one exception how ever. We exclude from the original failure detector space of (1] , failure detectors that can guess the fu ture (these cannot be implemented even in a perfectly synchronous system), and we focus only on realistic failures detectors that indeed encapsulate synchrony assumptions.
At first glance, our result seems to introduce a contra diction. As we recalled above, it was shown in !l] that S solves consensus even if we do not restrict the num ber of faulty processes, and 8 is strictly weaker than P. How can P be the weakest? Interestingly, and as we show in the paper, within the space of realistic fail ure detectors, 8 and P have the same computational power. As observed in [12] , this means that the dif ference between these classes is rather artificial in our general environment.
To summarise, our paper shows that, in an environ ment where we do not bound the number Of faulty pro cesses, the exact information about failures needed to solve consensus (hence atomic broadcast) and termi nating reliable broadcast is captured by P. In short, we collapse the failure detector hierarchy: P ends up being the only useful class in the hierarchy to solve agreement problems. A posteriori, this is not that sur prising and our results might explain why developers of reliable distributed systems have been considering, as a basic bUilding block [14], a group membership service, which precisely aims at emulating a Perfect failure detector, Le., when a process is suspected, Le., timed-out, it is excluded from the group: every suspi cion hence turns out to be accurate [4, 6, 16] .
As a side effect of our work, we point out two inter esting results in our general environment. First, if we consider the correct-restricted variant of consen sus (Le., nQn-uniform consensus), P is clearly not the weakest. A simple corollary of this observation is that (uniform) consensus is strictly harder than the correct restricted variant of consensus. Second, we also · re visit the view that consensus and atomic broadcast are strictly weaker problems than terminating reliable broadcast.
2 System model 
Failure patterns and environments
We consider a distributed system composed of a finite set of n processes n = {Pl,P2, ... ,Pn} ( Inl = n > 3 ). A process Pi is said to crash at time t if Pi does not perform any action after time t (the notion of action is recalled below). Failures are permanent, i.e., no process recovers after a crash. A correct process is a process that does not crash. A fa ilure pattern is a function F from 4:> to 2°, where F(t) denotes the set of processes that have crashed through time t. The set of correct processes in a failure pattern F is noted
correct(F).
An environment E is a set of failure patterns. En vironments describe the crashes that can occur in a system. In this paper, we consider the environment that contains all possible failure patterns. That is, we do not bound the number of processes that can crash.
Failure detectors
Roughly speaking, a failure detector V is a distributed oracle which gives hints about failure patterns. Each process Pi has a local failure detector module of V, 347 denoted by Vi. Associated with each failure detec tor V is a range Rv 3 of values output by the failure detector. A failure detector history H with range R is a function H from n x 4:> to R. For every process P i E n, for every time t E 4:>, H(p" t) denotes the value of the failure detector module of process Pi at time t, i.e., H(Pi' t) denotes the value output by Vi at time 
Algorithms
An algorithm using a failure detector D is a collection A of n deterministic automata Ai (one per process Pi). C omputation proceeds in steps of the algorithm. In each step of an algorithm A, a process Pi atomically performs the following three actions: (1) Pi receives a message from some process Pj, or a "null" message Aj (2) Pi queries and receives a value d from its fail ure detector module Vi (d E Rv is said to be seen 3When the context is clear we omit the subscript. 
Schedules and runs
A run of of A using V is a tuple R =< F, H, C, S, T > where H is a failure detector history and H E V(F), C is an initial configuration of A, 5 is an infinite sched ule of A, T is an infinite sequence of increasing time values, and in addition to the conditions above of a partial run {(I), (2) and (3», the two following condi tions are satisfied: (4) every correct process takes an infinite number of steps, and (5) every message sent to a correct process Pi is eventually received by Pj'
Solvability
An algorithm A solves a problem B using a failure detector V if every run of A using V satisfies the spec ification of B . We say that V solves B if there is an algorithm that solves Busing V. We say that a failure detector VI is stronger than a failure de tector V2 (V2 :j VI) if there is an algorithm that transforms VI into V2, Le., that can emulate V2 with VI [lJ. The algorithm does not need to emulate all histories of 1)2. It is required however that for every run R =< F, H, C,8, T > where HE VI(F), the out put of the algorithm with R is a history of V2 (F). We say that VI is strictly stronger than V2 ('02 -< VI) if V2 :j VI and VI � V2. Finally, we say that a failure detector V is the weakest to solve a problem B if (a) V solves Band (b) any failure detector that solves B is stronger than V.
Realistic failure detectors
Stating that failure detector class V is the weakest to solve a problem X hides an implicit assumption: the set of failure detectors among which V is the weak est. Without precisely defining that set, the state ment is simply meaningless. In [2] , OS is shown to In this paper, we restrict our space to failure detec tors as functions of the "past" failure pattern. In the following, we first define the class 'R of realistic failure detectors (those that cannot guess the future), which include among others, Eventually Perfect and Strong failure defectors. In other words, class 'R intersects with both classes S and O'P. We then illustrate this notion through two simple examples.
Definition
Roughly speaking, we say that a failure detector is realistic if it cannot guess the future. In other words, there is no time t and no failure pattern F at which the failure detector can provide exact information about crashes that will hold after t in F. More precisely, we define the class of realistic failure detector 'R, as the set of failure detectors V that satisfy the following property:
• V(F, F') E E Vt E <P s.t. Vt. S t, F(tt) = F'(td, we have:
Basically, a failure detector V is realistic if for any pair of failure patterns F and F' that are similar up to a given time t, whenever V outputs some information at a time t -k in F, V could output the very same information at t � kin F'. In other words, a realistic failure detector cannot distinguish two failure patterns according to what will happen in the future.
Note that if a failure detector V is realistic, then, for any failure pattern F, the output of V at time t is a function of F up to time t.
Examples
We illustrate below our notiop through two failure de tector examples: a realistic and a non-realistic one.
The Scribe
We describe here the Scribe failure detector C. • 'r/t E !Il, 'rIPi E fl, H(pi, t) = Fit].
It is obvious to see that failure detector C is realistic:
it actually belongs to P.
The Marabout
Consider failure detector M (Marobout), defined in [9] . 
Intuitions
We prove our lower bound result in two steps: we show that (a) any consensus algorithm is total: the causal chain of any decision event contains a message from every process that has not crashed at the time of the decision; and then (b) if a failure detector V implements a total consensus algorithm, then V can be transformed into a Perfect failure detector.
• (a) The first part of the proof (Le., in the first lemma below) uses the fact that we do not re strict the number of faulty processes. Intuitively, we show here that no process can reach a con sensus decision without having "consulted" ev ery correct process. This is to prevent the case where, after the decision, all processes crash ex cept the process that was not "consulted" and this process decides later differently. 
Total consensus
Let A be any algorithm that solves consensus. We call decision events in A, the events by which processes decide a consensus value. We say that A is total if any decision event in A at time t contains, in its causal
, a message sent by every process that has not crashed by time t.
Lemma 4.1 Consider the environment where we do not bound the number of processes that can crash. Ev ery consensus algorithm using a realistic failure detec tor in this environment is total.
PROOF (SKETCH): Assume by contradiction that
there is a consensus algorithm A that is not total.
This means that there is a run Ro of A such that, in Ro, some process P i has a decision event e executed at some time t (e is the event by which Pi decides some value v), and a process Pj that has not crashed by t, such that no message from Pi is in the causal chain of e. Assume without loss of generality that the decision v is O. As there is no message from P j in the causal past of e, we can assume that the value proposed by P j is 1. Now consider the following runs:
• R1: RI is similar to Ro, except that Pj does not receive any message from any other process be fore time t, Le., we delay in Rl the reception of all messages by Pj. Moreover, no process P k, k '" i, j, takes any step after its last step in the causal past of e, until time t. Since Pj does not participate in the decision e of Ro, then Pi exe cutes event e in Rl and also decides 0 at some time t (as in Ro).
• R2: in R2, the failure pattern is the same as in RI until time t, �nd all processes crash at time t, except Pj which is correct. Moreover, no pro cess take steps until time t. By the termination property of consensus, Pi decides at some time t ' in R2, and by the validity property of consensus, P j actually decides 1 at t'.
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• R3: the failure pattern of R3 is exactly the same as in R2, but, until time t, all processes are scheduled exactly as in RI and all messages be tween are sent and received as in RI. Moreover, Pj is scheduled as in R2 and all messages from and to Pi are delayed after time t2.
As the failure detector is realistic, it can behave in R 3 as in RI until time t. In this way, Pi behaves in R3 as in RI and decides O. But, Pj behaves in R3 as in R2 and Pj decides 1: contradicting the agreement property of consensus. 0
Reduction
Let A be any total consensus algorithm using V. We 3. Whenever a process Pi executes a decision event e (Le., Pi decides some value), Pj adds to output(P)j every process Pi such that [Pi is alive]
is not attached to e . PROOF: We prove that the failure detector emulated in output(P) ens�res strong completenes� and strong accuracy. Consider first completeness. Let Pi be any process that crashes and P j a correct process. There is a time after which Pi does not send any message .
By the termination property of consensus, Pj eventu ally decides in that execution, i.e., by executing some decision event e. Given that the information [Pi is alive] is not attached to e, P i adds to output(P)j Pi and never removes it, i.e., P i permanently suspects Pi . 
Consensus vs uniform consensus
We considered in this paper the uniform variant of the consensus problem. In this variant, no two processes should decide differently, whether they are correct or not [lOJ. Does our result apply to the correct-restricted variant of consensus where agreement is only required among correct processes? Addressing this question is appealing from a theoretical point of view (even if this form of consensus is rather meaningless in practice).
The answer is "no" .
. Even if we consider only realistic failure detectors and we do not bound the number of failures, the weakest failure detector class for consensus is not P. There is an algorithm given in [81 that solves correct-restricted consensus with a strictly weaker class, which we de note by P < (the class of Partially Perfect failure detec tors). Class P < is defined through the strong accuracy property of P and the following partial completeness property: If a process Pi crashes, then eventually ev ery correct process Pi such that j > i permanently suspects Pi. It is easy to see that if we do not restrict the number of faulty processes, P < is strictly weaker than P: roughly speaking, this is because a process P i has no knowledge about any process P j such that j > i. Interestingly, this actually means that uniform consensus is strictly harder than consensus. 
Strength vs perfection
